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Abstract  
In this paper the authors calculate OCA-indexes for industrial countries in an effort to 
estimate the benefit-cost ratio of adopting a common currency. The results correspond to the 
estimation of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b) and show that the ranking of the economies 
suitable to form a monetary union stays the same in the 1980s as well as in the 1990s. In other 
words, the economies, which were structurally close to each other in the 1980s, remain close 
in the 1990s and the opposite is valid for the structurally different economies. This empirical 
estimation also does not provide evidence for views, which emphasise the seemingly striking 
difference between the core and the periphery of the European Union. The authors perform 
also an estimation of the same index by including the Czech Republic and find no support for 
the view that the economy of the Czech Republic could possibly structurally differ more than 
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the EMU member countries between each other. Then they conclude that if the EMU is 
sustainable, the accession of the Czech economy should not change it.  
 
JEL Classification:  
E32, F42, E42, F33 
Keywords:  
Optimum currency area – EMU – monetary policy – convergence – core and periphery  
  
4
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The optimum currency area (OCA) theory arises from the debates about the exchange 
rate regimes and adjustment under balance of payments disequilibria. Mundell (1961) in his 
seminal work on OCA theory challenged Friedman’s (1953) view on floating exchange rate 
regime as means to the adjustment under balance of payments disequilibria due to exogenous 
shocks. Mundell (1961) in his model of an asymmetric shift in demand of two countries 
stressed that optimum currency area can differ from the actual currency area. Such difference 
could cause inability of the floating exchange rate regime to cushion the shock and bring the 
countries back to equilibrium. That is why Mundell (1961) offered some non-exchange rates 
means for adjustment, as labor mobility, nominal flexibility and fiscal transfers. Later, Ingram 
(In: Kawai, 1987), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) extended the list of non-exchange rate 
means for adjustment by considering financial integration, openness and national product 
diversification.1   
 According to McKinnon (2000) Mundell presents a neo-Keynesian model, still in a 
belief that it is possible to eliminate the effect of shocks by national monetary and fiscal 
policies. There is also another neo-Keynesian relic: Mundell’s implicit assumption of the 
downward sloping and stable Phillips curve.    
 However, there are two other later articles of Mundell (1973a, 1973b), which bring 
completely different argumentation concerning the optimum currency area. This is his 
monetarist view on the subject: if countries can adopt common currency without substantial 
change in their purchasing parities, then they gain better allocation of the capital, since they 
will get rid of the uncertainty in the exchange rates. Foreign reserves will have to increase less 
than proportionally with the size of the economy. Then, under asymmetric shocks in countries 
with common currency, there will not be the decline in output, because the costs of absorbing 
the shocks would be effectively spread in time. The existence of two Mundell models - early 
and recent - explains why he is heavily quoted both by proponents and skeptics of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU).  
 This paper instead of looking for the crucial economic characteristics to determine 
where the (illusionary) borders for exchange rates should be drawn we concentrate on benefits 
and costs of the common currency. That means that we assume that by definition no single 
country fulfills completely the attributes to make it an optimal member of a monetary union.   
 Moreover, it is a relevant question – in this context – how much the trade integration 
matters. There are at least two views on this issue. First, countries can benefit from higher 
trade integration because it leads to more effective allocation of resources. With higher trade 
integration there will be further synchronization of national business cycles because trade 
among European countries is typically intra-industry trade based on economies of scale and 
                                               
1 This search for optimum currency area characteristics is not exhausted by these examples. For survey see 
Horvath (2001).  
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imperfect competition. Thus, it will not lead to higher specialization and – above all – it will 
not lead to higher possibility of asymmetric shock occurrence.  
 Proponents of the second view2 argue that higher trade integration will lead to higher 
specialization. Because of the economies of scale, higher integration will lead to the regional 
concentration of the industrial activity. Thus asymmetric shocks are more likely to occur in 
the future (since the output is less diversified) and this will bring extra costs to monetary 
union.  
 Frankel and Rose (1998a, b) show that the higher the trade integration, the higher the 
correlation of business cycle among countries.3 Furthermore, they emphasize that business 
cycle and trade integration are inter-related and endogenous processes to establishing a 
currency union. Thus, they demonstrate that countries may fulfill the OCA criteria ex post, 
although they did not fulfill them ex ante. Monetary union entry raises trade linkages among 
the countries and this causes the business cycle to be more symmetric among the participants 
of the union.4 The arguments of Frankel and Rose (1998a,b) lead to a conclusion that the costs 
of implementing common currency are relatively low. However, there are some doubts on the 
validity of the endogenous OCA criteria. In a theoretical model Hallett and Piscitelli (2001) 
show that the validity of endogenous OCA hypothesis is uncertain and dependent to a large 
extent on the structural convergence in the beginning phase of the monetary union. Without 
the sufficient structural convergence, implementing common currency would cause greater 
divergence.  
 Maybe the interesting question is not the search for the optimal exchange rate regime, 
but the search for the optimal variability of the exchange rate. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997a,b and 1998) suggest an approach for modelling exchange rate variability, which takes 
into account the multiple interdependency of the economies. This paper follows the line, 
which Bayoumi and Eichengreen begin. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to estimate to what 
degree the exchange rate variability may be explained by the traditional OCA criteria, as 
defined in the classical OCA literature in the 1960s. Also, this paper attempts to determine the 
so-called OCA-indexes, which for given pairs of countries assess the benefit-cost ratio for 
adopting a common currency.   
 The paper is structured in the following manner. In section 2 we provide the 
methodology of estimation, in section 3 we present the results. Finally, we summarise and 
conclude.  
                                               
2 Krugman (1993). De Grauwe (1997) discusses the limitations of Krugman’s view. He shows that Krugman 
assumes that the regional concentration of industry will not cross the borders of the member countries, while 
borders will be less relevant in influencing the shape of these concentration effects. If so, then asymmetric shock 
will not be country specific and floating exchange rate could not be used to deal with asymmetric shocks 
anyway. In addition there will be trade creation among the monetary union countries.   
3 See Rodrick (2000) for a critique of econometric methods used by Frankel and Rose (1998a, 1998b). 
4 According to Fidrmuc (2001) the intensity of intra-industry trade is another variable with positive impact on the 
synchronization of business cycle.   
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2. METHODOLOGY  
 Countries experiencing symmetric shocks or high trade linkages tend to have stable 
exchange rates. In other words the more the OCA criteria among the countries are fulfilled, 
the lower should be the exchange rates variability among considered countries. Under this 
assumption we estimate the equation:  
SD(eij) = a + b1SD(?yi-?yj) + b2DISSIMij + b3TRADEij + b4SIZEij         (1) 
SD(eij) measures the volatility of bilateral nominal exchange rates, SD(?yi-?yj) captures the 
asymmetric shocks at national level, TRADEij is the proxy for intensity of trade linkages, 
DISSIMij assesses the asymmetric shocks at industrial level and SIZEij measure the size of the 
economy and assess utility from maintaining own currency.5  
 The proxies are computed as follows: SD(eij) is the standard deviation of the change in 
the logarithm of the bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j on monthly basis, 
SD(?yi-?yj) is the standard deviation of the difference in the logarithm of real output between 
i and j, DISSIMij is the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of agricultural, mineral, 
and manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade, TRADEij is the mean of the ratio of 
bilateral exports to domestic GDP for the given two countries, and SIZEij is the mean of the 
logarithm of the two GDPs measured in U.S. dollars.  
The data sample contains twenty-one industrial countries for the period from 1989 to 
1998. These are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. For convenience we label these data as 
representing the 1990s. When calculating variable SD(eij) we used the data from IFS-IMF, the 
data for SD(?yi-?yj) were calculated from World Bank, TRADEij was calculated using the data 
from Directions of Trade – IMF and World Bank, variable DISSIMij  was calculated with the 
use of the data from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade-OECD and  SIZEij from the World 
Bank data. When putting together the data matrix we follow the advice of Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997a,b and 1998), this allows me to compare the results for different time 
periods.   
 Since we are interested whether the exchange rate variability is explicable by 
traditional OCA criteria, we consider the variables with the impact across the borders in all 
the equations. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a,b and 1998) find little evidence that more 
open economy tends to fix its currency. But since the openness is also one of the traditional 
OCA criteria, we include the proxy for openness, too.6  This means that we estimate the 
following equation: 
                                               
5 The lower the size the lower the relative utility of maintaining its own currency. SIZEij can possibly capture the 
effect of adjustment costs, too. The bigger the countries are in economic terms, the higher the costs of transition 
to adopting of common currency. 
6 The proxy was calculated as an arithmetic mean to the i-th and j-th country ratio of trade (export + import) to its 
GDP.  
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SD(eij) = a + b1SD(?yi-?yj) + b2DISSIMij + b3TRADEij + b4OPENij       (2). 
The analysis takes into account all the relationships between each of the economies. 
There is a pair of countries in each row of the data matrix. Given 20 industrial countries we 
obtain 190 observation.7 The expected signs of explanatory variables are as follows: the 
exchange rate volatility is expected to depend positively on business cycle, dissimilarity in the 
commodity structure of export, and negatively on the trade linkages. The expected sign of the 
openness is theoretically indeterminate.8 
We are aware that there is a possibility that the independent variable influences the 
dependent variable, i.e. there is a potential influence of exchange rates variability on growth 
or volume of trade. However, taking the standard deviation of output and volume of bilateral 
trade considerably reduces this influence.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 The relationship of the first country with second one is the same as the second one with the first. That’s why the 
number of observation equals 20!/18!2!. Since the data for calculation of the variable DISSIM were not available 
for Greece except the year 1997, we finally excluded Greece from the analysis. At first, we took the data for the 
year 1997 as an average measure of Greece’s DISSIMij for the period 1989-1998, but the tests on outliers using 
studentized residuals showed that many observations on Greece are outliers even at p-value lower than 0.01. If 
this was caused by the lack of the data or for another reason is uncertain.  
8 See Isard (1995). 
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3. RESULTS 
We begin by exploring some basic descriptive characteristics of the data set. As it is 
seen in Table 1 there is a tendency towards increasing volatility in the exchange rate data. 
Low variability in the 1960s is due to Bretton-Woods system, while higher volatility in 1970s 
maybe the consequence of the failure of the Bretton-Woods and the oil shocks. In the 1980s 
there was a slow return to equilibrium and exchange rate variability was again declining. The 
high volatility of the exchange rates in the 1990s is caused by numerous financial crises and 
more generally by the rising financial flows among the countries and its spillover effects. 
However, variability in the second half of the 1990s is decreasing; quite understandably as a 
consequence of institutional arrangements of EU9 and the advance in the EU monetary 
integration. This conclusion is supported both by monthly and yearly data as depicted in Table 
1 and 2.  
Table 1 – Exchange Rates Volatility, Based on Yearly Data   
Exchange Rates 
Volatility 
1960s 0,033 
1970s 0,086 
1980s 0,076 
1990s 0,094 
1989-93 0,082 
1994-98 0,048 
Note: Volatility in this table means average of the standard deviations of the change in the logarithm of the 
bilateral exchange rate, based on monthly data.  
 
Table 2 – Exchange Rates Volatility, Based on Monthly Data   
Exchange Rates 
Volatility 
1990s 0,1039 
1989-93 0,0857 
1994-98 0,0662 
Note: Volatility in this table means average of the standard deviations of the change in the logarithm of the 
bilateral exchange rate, based on monthly data.  
 
One can expect that the OCA criteria will explain less of the exchange rates variability 
in the 1990s than e.g. in the 1980s due to the advances in monetary integration in the EU and 
also due to EMS financial crisis in 1992-1993.  
 
                                               
9 See Cech and Komarek (2002) on survey of the institutional arrangements of EU concerning exchange rate 
issues. 
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Table 3 – Exchange Rate Volatility for Selected Countries of the EU, in the 1990s 
 Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Switzerland Ireland 
Belgium 0,012      
Germany 0,006 0,008     
Denmark 0,012 0,011 0,010    
Switzerland 0,043 0,039 0,042 0,038   
Ireland 0,048 0,050 0,048 0,047 0,083  
Netherlands 0,007 0,007 0,003 0,011 0,041 0,050 
 
Note: Volatility in this table means the standard deviation of the change in the logarithm of the bilateral 
exchange rate between countries i and j; based on monthly data.  
 
Very low exchange rate volatility persists in the core EU countries. However, it is 
difficult to find the criteria, which would clearly distinguish the core from the remaining 
countries as it is presented in the paper below. We present the exchange rate variability in 
Table 3.10   
Another concern is symmetry of the shocks (variable SD(?yi-?yj)) as Table 4 depicts. 
If the national business cycle is fully synchronized, the value would reach zero. Again, the 
shocks in the EU core are relatively low, but here the difference between the core and other 
EU countries is not so striking as was for the exchange rate volatility. 
 
Table 4 – Symmetry of the Shocks for Selected Countries, in the 1990s 
Germany France 0,0053 
France Italy 0,0059 
Germany Italy 0,0071 
Belgium France 0,0076 
Belgium Italy 0,0091 
Denmark Great Britain 0,0100 
Belgium Germany 0,0113 
Austria Germany 0,0120 
Spain Portugal 0,0128 
Note: Symmetry of shocks in this context are measured as the standard deviation of the difference in the 
logarithm of real output between countries i and j.11  
 
                                               
10 We present in Table 3 only the countries having lowest volatility of exchange rate. Full table available for all 
possible pairs of twenty countries in our sample is available upon request from the author.  
11 Ireland has relatively high asymmetric shocks with most of EU countries. E.g. asymmetry of the shocks with 
Germany was one of the highest in our data sample and reached 0,1311. This is partially caused by the high 
growth rates in Ireland. The shocks of the Czech Republic with Germany are below European average with value 
0,0298. The European average was 0,046. However, the asymmetry of shocks between Czech Republic and 
Austria is very high of value 0,1344, roughly three times higher than European average.  
  
10
The results for trade linkages (TRADEij) are straightforward. Clearly, the countries like 
Austria, Belgium, Germany or Netherlands have strong bilateral trade within each other. The 
Czech Republic is also closely tied to Germany by trade. However, the dissimilarity of 
exports (DISSIMij) of the countries presented in Table 5 is around European average. The 
trade linkages of Czech economy with other EU countries are not as strong as with Germany 
e.g. the value for another geographical neighbor Austria is 0,016, slightly twice above 
European average. 
 
Table 5 – Trade Linkages and Dissimilarity of Exports for Selected Countries 
  a b 
Belgium Netherlands 0,0689 0,287 
Belgium Germany 0,0687 0,129 
Germany Netherlands 0,0676 0,416 
Germany Czech Republic 0,0665 0,131 
Belgium France 0,0646 0,078 
Austria Germany 0,0529 0,052 
Germany Ireland 0,0426 0,304 
Average in EU 0,007 0,293 
a - the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic GDP for the given two countries 
b - the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of agricultural, mineral, and manufacturing trade in total 
merchandise trade 
 
The descriptive statistics results for the Czech Republic are an evidence of strong 
linkages with Germany and one may put forward the view that its economy should not 
encounter difficult problems when adopting euro. However, as showed in Horvath – Komarek 
(2002) the results can be different when the whole EU instead of Germany is considered as 
benchmark. Horvath – Komarek (2002a) compare the structural similarity of the Czech 
Republic and Portugal to the German economy and find that the Czech economy is closer. 
The results are reversed when the EU economy is taken into account as a benchmark country. 
The estimation of the equation (1) yields the following:  
Table 6 – Results of Estimation of Equation (1) 
 Coefficient t-Statistic 
Variability of output 0,089 0,78 
Trade ratio -0,121 -5,6 
Size of economy 0,016 4,15 
Dissimilarity of exports 0,016 1,9 
   
Number of observations 190 
R-squared 0,2 
S.E.E. 0,04 
F-Statistic 11,47 
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Bayoumi – Eichengreen (1997a) point out that the equation (1) has the more 
significant power the lower the government interference in the exchange rate market. The data 
from 1960s to 1980s support their hypothesis. Our estimation does not either contradict this 
hypothesis. 
The value of R2 is not high, which may support the hypothesis that traditional OCA 
criteria explain less of the variability of the exchange rates in the 1990s than 1980s as 
measured by Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1997a).12 All variables are jointly significantly different 
from zero suggesting that the OCA criteria do explain some of the variability of the exchange 
rates. The assumptions for classical linear model were fulfilled.13  
The estimation of the equation (1) without the independent insignificant variable SD(?yi-?yj) 
yielded the following:  
 
Table 7 – Results of Estimation of Equation (1) without Considering the Variable 
Describing the Symmetry of Shocks, SD(? yi-? yj) 
 Coefficient t-Statistic 
Trade ratio -0,121 -5,57 
Size of economy 0,015 4,15 
Dissimilarity of exports 0,016 2,03 
   
Number of observations 190 
R-squared 0,2 
S.E.E. 0,04 
F-Statistic 15,12 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
12 Compare with Table 13 in Appendix, e.g. their resulting R2 from equation (1) for the data sample from the 
1980s was 0.51. 
13 Even heteroskedasticity was not the case as one may wonder because of the institutional arrangements of 
exchange rate regimes in the EU. We tested it by White general test. The results are upon request from the 
authors.  
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Table 8 – Results of Estimation of Equation (2) 
 Coefficient t-Statistic 
Variability of output 0,177 1,63 
Trade ratio -0,084 -4,13 
Openness -0,001 -6,45 
Dissimilarity of exports 0,007 0,85 
   
Number of observations 190 
R-squared 0,29 
S.E.E. 0,04 
F-Statistic 18,42 
 Note: Exclusion of the variable SD(?yi-?yj) changes only minimally the results.  
 
As the last step, we include the proxy for openness. The results of the estimation of the 
equation (2) are in Table 8. Contrary to estimations of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a,b), 
this variable is significant and explain a large extent of the exchange rate variability 
suggesting that more open economies tended more to fix their currencies in the 1990s. It 
seems that openness is better proxy for explaining the exchange rate volatility in the 1990s by 
traditional OCA criteria measured by R2 or by joint significance of the variables rather than 
the size of the economy. Also, R2 increased from 0,2 to 0,29 and F-Statistic from 15,12 to 
24,36. Since the variable DISSIMij was not significant we also present the estimation of the 
equation (2) without this variable. The output is in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 – Results of Estimation of Equation (2) without Considering Shocks at Industrial 
Level, DISSIMij 
 Coefficient t-Statistic 
Variability of output 0,2 1,86 
Trade ratio -0,08 -4,31 
Openness -0,001 -6,57 
   
Number of observations 190 
R-squared 0,28 
S.E.E. 0,04 
F-Statistic 24,36 
  
All our estimations can be compared with former results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997a) on the data from 1960s to 1980s reported in Appendix – Table 13 for 21 industrial 
countries. 
From the above regression equations we calculate OCA-index, which is the predicted 
value of exchange rate variability. The lower the OCA-index is, the higher is the benefit-cost 
ratio for monetary integration for the pair of the countries. The resulting ranking of the 
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economies as well as joint significance and satisfactory high R2 of all of the regressions 
strongly supports the idea that OCA-indices have some explanatory power.  
It is interesting to have a look what are the OCA-indices for the recent EMU members. 
EMU countries are closer to each other than to the remaining industrial countries. We present 
OCA-indexes calculated using the estimation results from Table 9, i.e. from estimation of 
equation (2) because of this provide the highest value of F-statistic. OCA-indexes resulting 
from the other tables, i.e. from estimation of equation (1) and (3) differ only to a small extent 
and therefore are not reported. The exception was OCA-index for Australia with New 
Zealand, which was very sensitive to the inclusion of the variable OPENij. These two 
countries are relatively closed, that may explain why their OCA-index is on average level. 
Using variable SIZEij, instead of variable OPENij change (lowers) the OCA-index for 
Australia and New Zealand suggesting relatively low costs for implementing common 
currency from the view of the OCA theory.   
 
Table 10 - OCA Indexes versus Germany  
Belgium 0,0179 
Netherlands 0,0376 
Austria 0,0622 
Ireland 0,0673 
Switzerland 0,0819 
Czech Republic 0,0862 
Denmark 0,0906 
Sweden 0,0961 
Portugal 0,0986 
France 0,1014 
Italy 0,1036 
Norway 0,1055 
Finland 0,1080 
Great Britain 0,1084 
Spain 0,1157 
Note: OCA index represents the predicted value obtained from estimating equation (2).   
 
We present the OCA indices versus Germany since obviously we need a metric, and Germany 
is the most straightforward one. The data available for the Czech Republic are only for the period 
1993-1998. The applicability of the OCA theory in the early stages of transition, e.g. in 1990-1992, is 
rather low since there are specific transitional problems which are not considered in the OCA theory. 
See Goldberg (1999), Horvath and Jonas (1998), Horvath and Komarek (2002), and Schweickert 
(2001) for discussion of specificity of the transition processes concerning the OCA theory.  However, 
the inclusion of the Czech Republic to data sample changed the estimations minimally. 
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Table 11 - OCA Indexes for Specific Relationships  
Belgium Netherlands -0,0071 
Belgium France 0,0233 
Great Britain Ireland 0,0233 
Canada USA 0,0271 
Belgium Ireland 0,0489 
Austria Netherlands 0,0714 
Netherlands Portugal 0,0747 
Austria Ireland 0,0857 
Austria Czech Republic 0,0905 
Average of the sample 0,1039 
 Note: OCA index represents the predicted value obtained from estimating equation (2). 
 
There is a significant difference between the values of OCA-indexes for Austria, 
Belgium, Germany and Netherlands and other European countries. The value of its OCA-
indices was often less than one standard error for the regression and clearly, there are no 
doubts about the beneficial consequences of the adoption of the common currency from the 
view of the structural characteristics of these economies. The resulting OCA-indexes for 
Ireland with these economies are also relatively low reflecting the fact of sufficient 
convergence of Irish economy. Portugal do not have high values of OCA-indices with these 
countries suggesting that there is no evidence on the sorting out the countries on core and 
periphery.14 The results for Germany vis-a-vis France imply that Euro adoption can 
potentially be relatively costly based on the view of the OCA theory. High values of OCA-
index and the size of the economy for Great Britain not only with Germany offer the 
arguments not to join the eurozone immediately after its creation. 
The other results are intuitively appealing, too. The values for Canada vis-a-vis USA, 
Great Britain vis-a-vis Ireland and Australia vis-a-vis New Zealand are very low indicating 
that these pairs of the countries are structurally very similar as expected. The considerations 
for these economies to adopt common currency largely occur in literature in the 1990s. Willett 
(2001) discusses the option of the common currency for USA and Canada and Grubel (1999) 
for NAFTA countries. Coleman (2001) considers the implementing common currency in 
Australia and New Zealand. Horvath and Komarek (2002) provide a short summary of the 
current integration processes throughout every continent. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) 
provide survey on operationalizing OCA theory. The most important variables for 
determining OCA-index are trade linkages, variability of output and also openness for the 
very open economies. If we compare the OCA-indexes versus Germany from our results with 
the results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b), we find out that the ranking of the 
economies changed a little from 1987 (compare Table 11 and Table 14).15 This is true also for 
                                               
14 See e.g. Bayoumi - Eichengreen (1993). Our finding corresponds to results of Fidrmuc - Korhonen (2001).  
15 We cannot compare the values of OCA-index from 1987 with ours since we have different data matrices. 
However, it is not the case for the ranking of the economies. 
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the OCA-indexes of the Czech Republic and Portugal with Germany in the 1990s. Horvath 
and Komarek (2002) find out lower OCA-index for Czech Republic by somewhat different 
approach. 
The resulting OCA-indexes for the Czech Republic cannot show that there are 
substantially bigger structural differences between Czech Republic and Germany than are the 
differences among EMU member countries. We can argue that the costs of implementing 
common currency for eurozone countries and the Czech Republic should be relatively low 
from the view of OCA theory. However, for the decision-making it is necessary to consider all 
the accession countries potentially adopting euro together and not separately due to its 
interdependence and economic size as also our analysis suggests.  
Finally, we provide evidence for importance of considering the international monetary 
system. We include the proxy DOLVARij for international regime, which captures the 
influence of the variability of U.S. dollar exchange rate on the exchange rates volatility in the 
remaining countries. The estimated equation then is: 
SD(eij) = a+b1SD(?yi-?yj)+b2DISSIMij+b3TRADEij+b4SIZEij+b5OPENij+b5DOLVARij          (3) 
where DOLVARij is calculated as arithmetic average of the variability of the U.S. dollar 
exchange rates for each country pair. The proxy takes on zero value when USA is one of the 
pair of the countries. We expect that the higher the variability of U.S. exchange rate, the 
higher the actual bilateral exchange rate for all the countries in the sample. The results are 
reported in Table 12. All the variables yield the expected signs and are jointly significantly 
different from zero. R2 is relatively high. Our results correspond to the findings of Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1997a, p.201) for the period of the 1960s (the sign was opposite for their 
estimation for the sample from 1970s and 1980s).  
 
Table 12 – Results of Estimation of Equation (3) 
 Coefficient t-Statistic 
Variability of output 0,238 2,30 
Trade ratio -0,079 -3,85 
Openness -0,001 -4,00 
Size of economy 0,013 2,63 
Dissimilarity of exports 0,012 1,54 
Variability of U.S. dollar 0,093 5,17 
   
Number of observations 190 
R-squared 0,38 
S.E.E. 0,04 
F-Statistic 18,45 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper the authors calculate OCA-indexes for industrial countries in an effort to 
estimate the benefit-cost ratio of adopting common currency between two countries. The 
results correspond to the estimation of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b) and show that the 
ranking of the economies suitable to form a monetary union stays the same in the 1980s as 
well as in the 1990s. In other words, the economies, which were structurally close to each 
other in the 1980s, remain close in the 1990s and the opposite is valid for the structurally 
different economies. This empirical estimation also does not provide evidence for views, 
which emphasize the seemingly striking difference between the core and the periphery of the 
European Union. The authors perform also an estimation of the same index by including the 
Czech Republic and find no support for the view that the economy of the Czech Republic 
could possibly structurally differ more than the EMU member countries between each other. 
Then we conclude that if the EMU is sustainable, the accession of the Czech economy should 
not change it. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 13 – The Results of equation (1) by Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1997a)  
Results for all countries using OCA variables 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 
SDY 0.5** 0.49** 1.46** 
TRADE(*10-2) -0.13* -0.46** -0.54** 
SIZE(*10-2) 0.13 1.7** 2.5** 
DISSIM(*10-2) 1.03** 1.89** 2.24** 
Observations 210 210 210 
F-test 6.6** 25.5** 35.6** 
R-squared 0.15 0.4 0.51 
Source: Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1997a), **, * - indicates significance at 5%, respectively 1%  
 
Table 14 – OCA index versus Germany in 1987 
Belgium 0.003 
Netherlands 0.003 
Austria 0.008 
Switzerland 0.038 
Ireland 0.043 
Denmark 0.063 
France 0.068 
Portugal 0.068 
Sweden 0.068 
Italy 0.07 
Norway 0.078 
Spain 0.088 
Finland 0.098 
U.K. 0.099 
Source: Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1997b) 
 
